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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
24 Colo. 107, 48 Pac. 963; Miller v. Sutliff (1911) 241 fl. 521, 94 N. E. 651;
Hunt v. Lewis (1914) 87 Vt. 528, 90 AtI. 578. The reason for this view is
stated in Miller v. Sutliff, supra, "If an intention not to perform constituted
fraud, every transaction might be avoided where the facts justified an in-
ference that a party did not intend to pay the consideration, or keep his
agreement." This seems to be nothing more than an assurance that the
doctrine of caveat emptor will be maintained in all its ancient viciousness.
In Missouri there are cases holding that a promise made with present in-
tent to break it is sufficient fraud to warrant a recission of the contract.
Laswell v. National Handle Co. (1910) 147 Mo. App. 497, 126 S. W. 969;
Culbertson v. Young (1901) 86 Mo. App. 277. However the rule seems to
be settled that "a promise made without intention to fulfill is not a misrepre-
sentation of an existing fact", within the rule that a misrepresentation of
fact is ground for recission. Younger v. Hoge (1908) 211 Mo. 444, 111 S. W.
20;Estes v. DesnoyersShoeCo. (1900) 155 Mo.577,56S.W.316. As was point-
ed out by the dissenting judge, the cases in which this minority rule has been
applied do not upon their facts call for its application. Furthermore, in the
instant case, the matter was before the court on a demurrer so that the issue
of legal sufficiency was clear cut. Had the court seen fit to do so, it could have
established the majority rule in this state, without necessarily overruling
previously decided cases, and the opportunity to decide this specific question
of law alone was afforded. It is somewhat to be regretted that Judge Gantt
was unable to prevail upon his associates to adopt the views which he ex-
pounds in the dissenting opinion, and thereby drawing this jurisdiction away
from old common law rules which favored chicanery. It seems hard to per-
ceive, from a practical point of view at least, how the court can refuse to
recognize the fraudulent nature of a promise made with present intent not
to perform. A. P., '33.
INTERNAL REVENUE-REFUNDS--AMENDMENT AFTER TIME FOR FLING
NEw CLAIM HAS ExPiRED.-Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
the United States, both written by Mr. Justice Cardozo, have served to clarify
the law of this important subject, although they have left it in a position
which seems highly illogical. The recent revenue acts have contained pro-
visions that in order to secure a refund a claim, in the form prescribed by
the regulations of the Treasury Department, must be made within a certain
period after the tax has been paid. The period for filing these claims with
the commissioner of internal revenue has varied. Under the Revenue Acts
of 1926 and 1928 it was four years, but the Revenue Act of 1932 reduced the
period to two years. 44 Stat. 66 (1926), 45 Stat. 871 (1928), 11 U. S. C.
1065b; Revenue Act of 1932 sec. 322.
In the first case the claim had been filed within the proper time, but was
too general to meet the tests of the regulation. Nevertheless, the federal
agents investigated the claim and were apparently about to allow it, when
the commissioner discovered it was not in the proper form. He notified the
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claimant of this, but did not reject the claim at that time. The claimant
then sought to amend the claim so as to specify properly the cause for which
the refund was sought. This amendment was sought to be made after the
time limit had run against the filing of new claims. Held: The amendment
should have been allowed. U. S. v. Memphis Oil Co. (1933) 53 S. Ct. 278.
In the second case the claim as originally filed was in the proper form in
that it specified a definite ground upon which the refund was claimed. After
the time for filing new claims had passed, the claimant tried to amend the
claim and set up another ground of recovery. Held: Such an amendment is
improper. U. S. v. Henry Prentiss & Co. (1933) 53 S. Ct. 283.
In the opinion in the Memphis Oil Co. case Mr. Justice Cardozo discusses
the analogies of cases of amendment after the Statute of Limitations has
run and reaches the conclusion that the law on this subject is so confused as
to furnish little help in the actual decision of the controversy. The general
principle is that the amendment must not change the cause of action after
such a period, but the cases are in inextricable confusion as to what amend-
ments have this effect. Clark, Code Pleading pp. 513-516. The earlier case
of Lewis v. Reynolds (1931) 284 U. S. 281 had held that the filing of a claim
for a refund "involves a redetermination of the entire tax liability" (but this
holding was made to support the commissioner's refusal to allow a refund
for the improper disallowance of one claimed deduction on the ground that
another claimed deduction was improperly allowed). The nature of the
claim for a refund is most nearly like an action under the common counts
for money had and received, and hence the specification may be made later.
The function of the time limitation is to prevent the presentation of stale
claims, while the function of the form prescribed by the regulations is to
aid research. The research had been done on the basis of the claim, and
hence the amendment should have been allowed. The opinion in the second
case is by no means so satisfactory. The opinion purports to decide the gen-
eral question of amendment from one specification to another, but relies
solely upon the special nature of the particular kind of claim first made and
the practice of the Treasury Department in dealing with claims of such a
nature not to make a general investigation.
It is settled that the commissioner may waive defects of form. Tucker V.
Alexander (1927) 275 U. S. 228; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. U. S. (1931) 283
U. S. 258. It has likewise been held that a defectively stated claim will not
support a suit when the defects were neither waived nor an attempt made
by the claimant to amend. U. S. v. Felt & Tarrant Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 269.
The commissioner may reject claims because they were not properly stated
and amendments cannot be made after such a rejection. Connell V. Hop-
kins (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 773; Sugar Land Ry. Co. v. U. S.
(Court of Claims 1931) 48 F. (2d) 973. Where the commissioner has re-
jected the claim because it was improperly stated, he is under no duty to
reopen the case so that an amendment may be made. Solomon v. U. S.
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 638.
There are several cases before the lower federal courts which reached es-
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sentially the same conclusion as the Memphis Oil Co. case, but they based
it on a different process of reasoning. In two cases where the facts were
virtually identical with the present case, the amendment was allowed on the
ground that all objections on the ground of form had been waived by the
investigation made of the claim and that the only purpose of the amendment
was to make a record which would be complete in form so as to aid the courts
when the case was later taken to them. Art Metal Construction Co. v. U. S.
(D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 379; Zeller v. U. S. (D. C. W. D. N. Y.
1929) 35 F. (2d) 870. The Court of Claims had taken the view that the
amendment should be allowed since the commissioner could pay on an in-
sufficiently stated claim and that the requirements as to form were only es-
sential when an appeal was made to the courts. Factors & Finance Co. v.
U. S. (Court of Claims 1932) 56 F. (2d) 903, aff'd (1933) 53 S. Ct. 287 (on
the basis of the opinion in the Memphis Oil Co. case as far as the question of
amendment was concerned).
It would seem that the result of these two cases is to encourage an attorney
who is not quite sure of the ground on which the claim is to be finally sup-
ported to file a mere general claim without making any attempt to follow the
regulations by being specific. If he does so, he can amend at any time before
the claim is rejected, while if he attempts to follow the regulations, he must
adhere to his first choice. This seems scarcely just. Moreover, any such
practice must have the effect either of forcing the agents to investigate every
feature of a complicated tax return as soon as a refund is claimed, or of be-
ing faced with claims on particular grounds for which they have not collected
the evidence, which may no longer be completely available. G. W. S., '33.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE-STATEMENTS BEFORE CoMmIs-
SIONS.-An insurance agent whose license had been revoked by the insurance
commissioner sued his former employers alleging the president of the de-
fendant company had slandered him by maliciously making false statements
to the commissioner in an effort to have his license revoked after he had
transferred to a rival company. Held. Such statements are absolutely
privileged because the insurance commissioner was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers (Tenn. 1933) 55 S. W. (2d)
767.
The scope and nature of absolute privilege have been well stated, "The
publication of defamatory words may be under an absolute or under a quali-
fied or conditional privilege. Under the former there is no liability although
the defamatory words are falsely and maliciously published. The class of
absolutely privileged communications is narrow and practically limited to
legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of state". Hassett v. Carroll
(1911) 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013; Odgers on Libel and Slander (6th ed.) 189.
When the occasion is absolutely privileged, the English courts extend this
protection whether or not the words are relevant to the proceeding. Daw-
kins v. Lord Rokeby (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 744; Seaman v. Netherclift (1876)
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